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The Disputed Oil Shale Claims:
Background and Current Conflict
Interest in oil shale' as a source of energy has revived in the
United States during the past decade,2 due largely to technologi-
cal advances enabling oil from shale to compete profitably with
petroleum from drilled wells.3 About seventy-five per cent of
the valuable oil shale lands are clearly under federal ownership,4
1. Oil shale is not technically shale, nor is its organic content oil.
The rock is a marlstone; the organic matter is a rubbery solid called
kerogen. Chemically, the primary difference between kerogen and
crude petroleum is geometric. By heating the kerogen to between 500
and 900 degrees Fahrenheit, the molecular structure yields an oil equiv-
alent which is about 66% of the kerogen's weight, plus a fuel gas and
a coke-like solid. The oil is viscous and high in sulfur and nitrogen
content; however, it can be refined into products similar to those derived
from crude petroleum. de Nevers, Tar Sands and Oil Shales, Scientific
American, Feb. 1966, pp. 21, 24; Kelly, Oil Shale: 1964 or 1984, WESTERw
RESOURCES CONFERENCE 237, 240 (1964); see generally Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on Oil Shale, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings].
2. See Cameron, Current Problems in Oil Shale Development, 10
RocKY MT. MiNERAL L. INsTITUTE 533, 538 (1965); Duscha, Bonanza in
Colorado-Who Gets It?, Atlantic Monthly, March 1966, p. 82.
3. Kelly, supra note 1; Steele, The Role of Economic Research in
Appraising the Future of Shale Oil, WESTE N RESOURCES CONFERENCE 261
(1964). Technology may have provided the answer in the "nick of
time" since some experts predict that oil shale will be needed to supply
a portion of North America's petroleum requirements by 1975. Oil &
Gas J., Nov. 1, 1966, p. 42.
Commercial recovery of the oil shale should begin this year, and
reach significant market proportions by 1970. de Nevers, supra note 1,
at 27, 29. There are two basic methods of recovery: mining and then
processing the shale; or heating it in place and then recovering the oil
through drilled wells. Thus far, most efforts have been limited to the
first method. de Nevers, supra note 1, at 24. Since the cost of mining
the shale, crushing it, and transporting it to the processing plant is three"
or four times the cost of the retorting, a feasible in situ recovery method
would result in a considerable economy. de Nevers, supra note 1, at 25;
Steele, supra at 263; see generally U.S. BUREAU OF MINEs, BULL. 611, OuL-
SHALE MINNG, RIFLE, COL., 1944-56, at 4 (1964). The in situ retorting
could be accomplished through underground combustion by means of
conventionally drilled wells, or underground nuclear explosions. For
discussions of these two processes see de Nevers, supra note 1, at 27;
Lekas & Carpenter, Fracturing Oil Shdae with Nuclear Explosives for
In-Situ Retorting, Colo. S. of Mines Q., July 1965, p. 7.
4. Cameron, supra note 2, at 535; Childs, The Status of the Oil
Shale Problem, Colo. S. of Mines Q., July 1965, p. 1; Kelly, supra note 1,
at 239.
Twenty-nine states have oil shale, although only the Green River
Formation deposits in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming have potential
commercial significance, containing over one trillion barrels of petro-
leum-like material. According to conservative estimates, 50 billion bar-
rels could presently be recovered at prices competitive with crude
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with the remainder divided between private owners and mining
claimants whose attempts to perfect their claims are currently
being contested by the government. 5 The conflict between the
mining claimants and the federal government is the principal
subject of this Note. To thoroughly understand the current con-
flict, however, it is necessary to examine the origin of the dis-
puted mining claims.
I. ORIGIN OF THE DISPUTED CLAIMS
Prior to 1866, prospectors searched for minerals on the public
domain with little or no interference from government officials.0
In an effort to bring order to these activities, Congress 7 passed a
general mining laws that basically adopted the customs and rules
of ownership established by the prospectors in the Gold Rush of
1849.9 Oil shale claims, which are based upon placer locations, 10
petroleum. National Fuels and Energy Study Group, An Assessment of
Available Information on Energy in the United States, S. Doc. No. 159,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1962). A more realistic appraisal, however,
would put the recoverable United States oil shale reserves in the neigh-
borhood of 500 billion barrels. Id. at 70-71; see also Childs, supra at
1; Statement of Under Secretary of the Interior John A. Carver, Jr.,
1965 Hearings 24; Jackson, Legal, Political, and Administrative Problems
in Oil Shale, WESTERN RESOURCES CONFERENCE 287 (1964); Oil & Gas J.,
Jan. 17, 1966, p. 41. The value of the Green River deposit is approxi-
mately seven times the national debt. Statement of Senator Allott of
Colorado, 1965 Hearings 8.
5. The disputed mining claims cover 338,000 acres of land in the
Piceance Creek Basin alone. This land contains about 100 billion bar-
rels. Another 380,000 acres containing over 100 billion barrels are al-
ready in private hands. The federal domain, which contains the thickest
and richest deposits, covers about 582,000 acres and is estimated to con-
tain 1.1 trillion barrels of oil. 1965 Hearings 27.
6. See generally Hochmuth, Government Administration and Atti-
tudes in Contest and Patent Proceedings, 10 RocKY MT. MINERAL L.
INsTrUTE 467 (1965); Pearl, Projected Impact of Pending Proposals to
Revise the Mining Laws, 9 RocKY MT. MiNERAL L. INsTITuTE 1, 6 (1964).
7. Article IV of the United States Constitution places the power
to dispose of the public lands exclusively in the Congress: "The Con-
gress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States . . . ." By general statutory provisions, the Department
of the Interior has the authority to administer the laws regulating pub-
lic lands and to conduct the general care of these lands. See, e.g., 5
U.S.C. §§ 481, 485; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 1201 (1964); Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. 450, 459 (1920).
8. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866).
9. Reidy, Do Unpatented Oil Shale Mining Claims Exist?, 43
DENvER L.J. 9, 10 (1966).
10. Petroleum was declared a mineral subject to discovery and
location under the general mining laws by the Petroleum Placer Act,
29 Stat. 526 (1897), 30 U.S.C. § 101 (1964). It was generally believed
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stem from a later act": bringing nonlode claims under the min-
ing laws. To encourage exploitation of the minerals in the public
domain,'12 the requirements for establishing and patenting a min-
ing claim were both easy and attractive. To establish a claim
the miner had to discover a valuable mineral 3 and locate his
claim. Location was accomplished by marking the ground, post-
ing notice of the claim, or recording it in a local recording office,
depending upon the requirements of applicable state law. '
Once the mining claim was established by a valid discovery
and proper location, the mining claimant obtained an equitable
and possessory interest in the land and its minerals.' 5 This in-
terest was "real property in the highest sense,"' 6 although legal
title to the land remained in the United States.'7 To become
the fee simple owner of the clair, the miner applied for a
that this act embraced oil shale as well as other types of petroleum
deposits. Reidy, supra note 9, at 12. In 1920 the Secretary of the
Interior [hereinafter referred to as the Secretary] issued instructions
confirming this belief. 47 Interior Dec. 548 (1920).
11. 16 Stat. 217 (1870), 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964). In 1872 Congress
combined the 1866 and 1870 acts into what remains the basic mining law.
Act of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91 (1891). (codified in scattered sections
of 30 U.S.C.). See generally Pearl, supra note 6; Reidy, supra note 9.
12. The policy of the 1872 Act is described in its preamble:
Except as otherwise provided, all valuable mineral deposits
in lands belonging to the United States, both surveyed and un-
surveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and purchase,
and the lands in which they are found to occupation and pur-
chase ....
REV. STAT. § 2319 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
13. Discovery occurs where minerals have been found and the evi-
dence is of such a character that a person of ordinary prudence would
be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means with
a reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine ....
Castle v. Womble, 19 Interior Dec. 455, 457 (1894).
Discovery is not necessarily the first step, but there can be no valid
claim until a discovery of a valuable mineral has been made. Cole v.
Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 296 (1920). See generally Mock, Marketability as
a Test of Discovery Under the Federal Mining Laws, 7 RocKy MT. MN-
ERAL L. INSTrrUTu 263 (1962).
14. REv. STAT. § 2324 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). Regulations
governing the location of placer claims are found in 43 C.F.R. § 185.24-.32
(1963).
15. See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 335-36
(1963).
16. See, e.g., Bradford v. Morrison, 212 U.S. 389, 395 (1909); Elder v.
Wood, 208 U.S. 226 (1908); Manuel v. Wolf, 152 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1894);
Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 767 (1876).
17. Reidy, supra note 9, at 11. The federal government, however,
never received notice of the mining clain until the claimant applied for
a patent. Brief for Defendant, p. 13, Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall, 261 F.
Supp. 954 (D. Colo. 1966).
1156 [Vol. 51:1154
DISPUTED OIL SHALE CLAIMS
patent to the land. 8 For five dollars per acre, the applicant
could, absent an adverse claimant, obtain the patent by showing
a valid discovery, proper location, and the expenditure of five
hundred dollars or more in labor or improvements on the claim.
It was not essential to apply for the patent;19 the miner
could retain his less than fee simple interest in the mining claim
by maintaining it in accordance with the mining laws.20  The
basic federal maintenance requirement was the performance of
assessment work consisting of the annual expenditure of at least
one hundred dollars in labor or materials to develop the claim;21
failure to do the assessment work in any one year subjected the
claim to relocation by another miner.22 If validly relocated, the
original claim was extinguished. 23 The only other way a miner
could lose his claim was to abandon it. 24
II. THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTACK ON THE OIL
SHALE CLAIMS
A decline in the discovery of new crude petroleum deposits
and an increase in the demand for oil caused by World War I
18. REv. STAT. § 2325 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
19. United States v. Carlile, 67 Interior Dec. 417, 421 (1960); Nome
& Sinook Co. v. Townsite of Nome, 34 Interior Dec. 276, 278 (1905).
20. Ibid.
21. Rav. STAT. § 2324 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). See Cole v.
Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 295 (1920); Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279, 282
(1881); Reidy, supra note 9, at 11.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. The relocation must occur before the original claimant
resumes his assessment work. Thus, if a mining claimant failed to per-
form his annual labor for one year, he would not ipso facto forfeit his
claim. Unless another miner entered the claim and met all the federal
and local statutory requirements for a valid relocation, the original
claimant could resume his assessment work in the following year with
no adverse consequences. See Belk v. Meagher, supra note 21; Nielson
v. Champagne Mining & Milling Co., 29 Interior Dec. 491 (1900).
24. See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 349 (1919). Thus far,
abandonment of mining claims has been determined by the historic test
of intent to abandon. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Madill, 53 Interior Dec.
195, 199 (1930), affd on rehearing, 53 Interior Dec. 203 (1931); Reidy,
supra note 9, at 11. Mere failure to do the annual assessment work is
not considered conclusive evidence of intent to abandon the claim. See,
e.g., Talache Mines v. United States, 218 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1954)
(determination of no abandonment for income tax purposes); Wiltsee
v. Utley, 79 Cal. App. 2d 76, 179 P.2d 13 (1947).
A co-owner of a mining claim could forfeit his interest in the claim
to his fellow co-owners by failing to contribute his share of the annual
assessment work. REv. STAT. § 2324 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964);
Hamilton v. Ertl, 146 Colo. 90, 360 P.2d 660 (1961).
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created an oil shale boom during the 1916-1920 period.2 i Ap-
proximately 30,000 oil shale placer mining claims were located
under the mining laws during this period.20 Only a few of these
claims were immediately taken to patent;27 the rest for the most
part were unworked and apparently forgotten or abandoned as
interest in oil shale declined after the war.28
A major factor contributing to the lessened interest in oil
shale was the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 which provided that
oil shale was no longer a locatable mineral under the mining
laws.29 However, section 37 of the act contained a savings clause
which provided that valid mining claims existent on the date of
the act "and thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws
under which initiated" could be patented under those laws. 3 0 In
the 1920's the Department of Interior prepared to test the scope
of this clause with an exhaustive investigation of all oil shale
claims.31 Contests were filed against those claims which were
deemed invalid for lack of discovery, abandonment, and failure to
perform annual assessment work.3 2 The latter charge was based
upon the theory that assessment wcrk was necessary not only to
preserve a claim against other miniag claimants, but also to pro-
tect it from forfeiture to the government. 33
25. See Jackson, Legal, Political, and Administrative Problems in
Oil Shale, WESTERN RESOURCES CONFERENCE 287 (1964).
26. Cameron, Current Problems in Oil Shale Development, 10
RocKy MT. MqINERAL L. INSTITUTE 533, 538 (1965).
27. Ibid. The first patent application on an oil shale claim was
apparently made in 1920. See Instructions, 47 Interior Dec. 548 (1920);
see also Jackson, supra note 25, at 289; Oil Shale Symposium, 43 DENVER
L.J. 1, 2-3 (1966).
28. The decline in interest in oil shale was caused by several fac-
tors. Some thought the Mineral Leasing Act, 41 Stat. 437 (1920), 30
U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1964), destroyed their claims; the demand for oil de-
creased with the end of World War I; new fields of crude petroleum
were discovered; and no economically competitive method for recover-
ing oil shale had been devised. See materials cited notes 26-27 supra.
29. 41 Stat. 437 (1920), 30 U.S.C. : § 181-263 (1964).
30. 41 Stat. 451 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1964).
31. 1927 SEC. OF rME INTERIOR ANN. REP. 29-30.
32. Only the claims subject to assessment work attacks are now
being contested in the courts, involving one hundred billion barrels of
oil shale. 1965 Hearings 27.
33. The same theory was used by the Interior in E.C. Kinney, 44
Interior Dec. 580 (1916), to deny a claim of damages caused by the
flooding of mining claims taken by the Secretary of the Interior under
the authority of a reclamation act. Failure to perform the annual as-
sessment work after the lands subject to the mining claims had been
withdrawn was held to constitute a forfeiture of the mining claims. The
rule stated in this case was originally promulgated in Instructions, 32
Interior Dec. 387 (1904). The Secretary stated that a mining claim on
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A. THE KRusm c DECISION
In Emil L. Krushnic,34 the Secretary charged that the claim-
ant had failed to do his assessment work for the year 1920, even
though such work had been resumed thereafter.3 5 The claimant
emphasized that the mining laws provided only two penalties for
failure to do the assessment work: the risk of losing the claim
by relocation, and the forfeiture by a noncontributing co-owner
of his interest in the claim. He argued that since by statute
only the rights of private parties, not those of the United States,
were affected by the failure to do the assessment work, jurisdic-
tion over controversies in this regard rested solely in the courts,
particularly since the Interior Department and the courts had in
the past declared that questions of annual assessment work were
outside the Interior's jurisdiction. The claimant further argued
that the Government should have at least challenged the validity
of his claim while the assessment work was in default since only
at that time could the claim have been relocated by an adverse
party.
In answer to the jurisdictional argument, the Secretary con-
cluded that since Congress intended the performance of annual
assessment work to be a "maintenance" requirement under sec-
tion 37, it was incumbent upon the Interior to decide this matter
to protect the rights of the United States. The Secretary sum-
marily rejected the claimant's second argument by stating that
it would be untenable to require the Government to act the part
of an adverse claimant.36 Under this decision, default in assess-
ment work automatically forfeited the claim.
While the Interior was challenging other claims on the basis
of failure to perform the annual assessment work, Krushnic
reached the Supreme Court and was reversed in an unanimous
decision.37 The Court stated that a default in assessment work
land withdrawn pursuant to the reclamation act could be divested by
failure to comply with the law, and "the land department has the juris-
diction to determine that question and to declare by its judgment
whether such right has been divested. . . ." This asserted authority as
exercised in the Kinney case was apparently never tested in the courts.
34. 52 Interior Dec. 282 (1927), on rehearing, 52 Interior Dec. 295
(1928). This was the first assessment work contest to come to the Sec-
retary. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 18, Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall, 261 F. Supp.
954 (D. Colo. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Trial Brief].
35. The Secretary also alleged fraudulent location and lack of dis-
covery, but these charges were dismissed on demurrer for insufficient
evidence. 52 Interior Dec. at 284.
36. This "untenable" position was taken by the Interior after
Krushnic was reversed. See notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text.
37. Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
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did not ipso facto forfeit the claim but only subjected it to loss
by relocation. If work was resumed before a valid relocation,
the mining claim was "preserved," not "restored."3 8  Thus, the
resumption of assessment work was the import of "maintained"
within section 37. Since oil shale lands could no longer be lo-
cated or relocated because of the act, an unworked claim re-
mained valid "unless at least some form of challenge on behalf
of the United States intervened."3 9
B. THE VIRGINIA-CoLORADO DECISION
After the Supreme Court's reversal, the Secretary inter-
preted Krushnic to mean that mining claims still could be con-
tested for failure to do annual assessment work if the challenge
were instituted while the work was in default.40 Consequently,
the Interior began posting notices of forfeiture of all oil shale
claims which were currently in default on assessment work.
41
In effect the government assumed the role of an adverse claim-
ant, although it performed no assessment work on the claims.
42
In 1935, the Supreme Court struck down this type of for-
feiture proceeding in Ikes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp.43 The
Court stated that the mining claimant "had lost no rights by
failure to do the annual assessment work; '44 and, therefore, the
Interior Department had acted "beyond the authority conferred
by law."45 Consequently, the Interior overruled all departmental
decisions in conflict with the Virginia-Colorado case,40 and there-
after abandoned its policy of challenging oil shale claims for fail-
ure to do annual assessment work. During the next thirty years,
106 patents were issued on oil shale claims. Seventy-one of these
patents covered one or more claims that had been declared void
38. Id. at 318.
39. Id. at 317-18.
After the Krushnic decision, the Secretary, in Standard Shales Prods.
Co., 53 Interior Dec. 42 (1930), vacated and remanded an earlier order
denying certain claimants patent entries because of default in their
assessment work. He also overruled Krushnic and all other department
decisions in conflict therewith.
40. Instructions, 52 Interior Dec. 131 (1930).
41. 1930 SEC. OF THE INTERIOR ANN. REP. 14.
42. By 1932, 11,146 oil shale mining claims had been declared null
and void. 1932 SEC. OF THE INTERIOR ANN. REP. 19. By 1933, the Annual
Report put the number at 12,099 claims covering 1,448,980 acres. 1933
SEC. OF THE INTERIOR ANN. REP. 60.
43. 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
44. Id. at 646.
45. Id. at 647.
46. See Shale Oil Co., 55 Interior Dec. 287, 290 (1935).
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for nonperformance of assessment work in the 1920-1930 contest
proceedings.47  Then, in 1964, the Interior reversed its position
and asserted that the earlier proceedings were a bar to patent
applications.
III. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY: TOSCO V. UDALL
In 1964, applications for patents were made on 257 oil shale
claims which had been declared null and void by the Interior
between 1930-1933 for default in annual assessment work. These
applications were rejected on the basis that the principles of
finality of administrative action, estoppel by adjudication, and
res judicata now barred assertion of the claims although the
earlier cancellations were incorrect as a matter of law. 48
In 1966, four cases were consolidated in the Federal District
Court of Colorado to prevent the assertion of the earlier con-
test proceedings against oil shale claims. 49 Three of the actions
were for mandatory orders compelling the Interior to issue
patents on the oil shale claims; the other was for a declaratory
judgment regarding the rights of the claimants to patents. The
oil shale claims in these cases had been subjected to contest pro-
ceedings, both before and after the Supreme Court decision in
Krushnic, for failure to do the annual assessment work.
Three separate grounds for relief were asserted by the claim-
ants. The first was that the 1928-1933 contest proceedings against
the claims were void for lack of jurisdiction, a position based
upon argument asserted by the claimant in the Krushnic case,50
and upon an interpretation of the Supreme Court decision in
the Virginia-Colorado case. The second ground asserted was that
the Interior in the Shale Oil decision in 1935 had adopted a rule
that the prior contest proceedings were void and without force or
effect, and that this rule could not be retroactively reversed.51
47. Plaintiff's Trial Brief, pp. 36-37.
48. Union Oil Co., 71 Interior Dec. 169 (1964).
49. Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall, 261 F. Supp. 954 (D. Colo. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as Tosco].
50. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
51. Most of the claims in Tosco were subjected to challenges sim-
ilar to those in Krushnic. Apparently, the Interior considered these
contests voided by Standard Shales Prods. Co., 53 Interior Dec. 42, 44-45
(1930), which overruled all department decisions in conflict with Krush-
nic, since it began new contests against the claims. Compare this pro-
cedure with the position taken by the Interior in Union Oil Co., 71
Interior Dec. 169 (1964). In that case, the Interior maintained that the
case of Shale Oil Co., 55 Interior Dec. 287 (1935), which performed a
similar housekeeping function after the decision in Ikes v. Virginia-
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The final ground asserted for relief was that even if the 1928-1933
decisions were regarded as merely erroneous the claimants could
now seek direct review and obtain their reversal. The district
court based its decision solely upon the first ground, -5 2 relying
upon the basic principle that a decision by a tribunal outside its
subject matter jurisdiction is of no effect whatsoever.
Whether the Interior in fact had acted outside its subject
matter jurisdiction in the earlier contest proceedings had to be
determined, in the court's view, by examining the Krushnic and
Virginia-Colorado opinions. The only penalty for failure to do
annual assessment work was the possible loss of the claim to
another miner,53 a matter for the courts, since the issue was out-
side the Interior's jurisdiction.54 The Krushnicr5 and Virginia-
Colorado56 cases reaffirmed this principle, even though the word
"jurisdiction" does not appear in the decisions. According to the
Virginia-Colorado decision, the grounds available to the Interior
to challenge the validity of a mining claim are lack of discovery,
fraud, "other defect," or abandomnent. 57  Since failure to do
assessment work was not a basis for challenging the validity of
a claim,58 the Virginia-Colorado Court concluded that the Inte-
rior's challenge went beyond the authority conferred by law.5 9
The court in Tosco, following these cases, decided that the In-
terior had no jurisdiction to declare mining claims void for fail-
ure to perform annual assessment work. The earlier contest pro-
ceedings were therefore void and provided no basis for denial of
patent applications.
Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935), with almost the same language,
did not void the contest proceedings instituted after the Krushnic de-
cision. 71 Interior Dec. at 175.
52. The plaintiffs had requested the court to decide all three issues
in order to avoid further unnecessary trials if the court were reversed
on one of the grounds. Post-Trial Brief for Plaintiffs, pp. 5-6, Oil Shale
Corp. v. Udall, 261 F. Supp. 954 (D. Colo. 1966).
53. See notes 21, 23 supra and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Eureka No. 1 Gold Mining & Milling Co.,
31 Interior Dec. 69 (1901); Barklage v. Russell, 29 Interior Dec. 401
(1900); P. Wolenberg, 29 Interior Dec. 302 (1899); Cain v. Addenda Min-
ing Co., 29 Interior Dec. 62 (1899); see also Nome & Sinook Co. v.
Townsite of Nome, 34 Interior Dec. 276 (1905); Marburg Lode Mining
Claim, 30 Interior Dec. 202 (1900); Nielson v. Champagne Mining &
Milling Co., 29 Interior Dec. 491 (1900).
55. 280 U.S. at 317.
56. 295 U.S. at 645.
57. Ibid.
58. "Plaintiff had lost no rights by failure to do the annual assess-
ment work; that failure gave the government no ground of forfeiture."
Id. at 646.
59. Id. at 647.
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Because of its immense economic impact, the Tosco deci-
sion undoubtedly will be appealed. Therefore, a more extended
discussion of the jurisdiction issue, and arguments raised by the
parties but ignored in the opinion, is appropriate. Even assum-
ing that the earlier contest proceedings lacked jurisdiction, the
Interior argued that they were res judicata. For support of this
proposition the government relied primarily upon two Supreme
Court cases, Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank60
and Butte, A. & R.R. v. United States.6 In Chicot, the plain-
tiff was barred from recovering on bonds of the defendant by a
prior decree of a district court effecting a readjustment plan for
the defendant's indebtedness. After the prior decree had been
entered, the statute empowering the district court to so act was
declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court rejected the plain-
tiff's argument that the decree had been rendered void when
the statute under which it was issued was declared unconstitu-
tional. Instead the Court held that the decree was res judicata
and immune from collateral attack. In Butte, the ICC, pursuant
to its statutory authority, ordered payments to certain railroads
to cover losses incurred while under government control during
the war. Two years later the ICC redefined the statutory term
"deficit," and the government attempted to recover the amounts
paid which would not have been allowed under this reinterpreta-
tion. The Court held the first order to be res judicata.
These two cases, while holding that an incorrect decision
may be res judicata, can be distinguished from Tosco. In the
Chicot case important economic interests were created in reli-
ance upon the validity of the first decree.62 No such economic
interests are present in Tosco. If there was any reliance upon
the earlier contest proceedings, it was by the mining claimants
upon the invalidity of those proceedings. The Government
clearly had not relied upon their validity. This factor is even
more important since the Court in Chicot specifically restricted
itself to the situation it faced.6 3 Also, the Chicot case was in-
directly limited in Kalb v. Feuerstein,64 where the Court indi-
cated that strong public policy considerations might defeat strict
application of res judicata.
The Butte case is more analogous to the Tosco situation ex-
60. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
61. 290 U.S. 127 (1933).
62. Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata In Administrative
Law, 1942 Wis. L. REV. 5, 27-28.
63. 308 U.S. at 375.
64. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
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cept that, like Chicot, important economic interests were created
in reliance upon the incorrect agency decision. Also, a specific
duty to take affirmative action had been imposed upon the
agency by the statute. According to the Court this imposition
necessarily entailed a duty to interpret the statute. Since Con-
gress had not provided a method of review, it must have in-
tended that the administrative action should bind the Govern-
ment and the private parties regardless of whether the error was
one of fact or law. 5
The affirmative duty to act was also a deciding factor in
West v. Standard Oil Co., 6 relied upon by the plaintiffs in
Tosco. Interior Secretary Fall had dismissed proceedings to
determine the mineral character of land allocated to California
under a grant of lands known to be nonmineral in character on
the date of the act. Four years later Secretary Work sought to
reopen the proceedings. The Court found that the dismissal had
not been based upon a finding of fact, but rather was based
upon a determination by Secretary Fall that as a matter of law
the Interior was estopped from challenging the grant.6 7 Such a
determination could not be res judicata since it was not made
within the authority of the Secretary. Only where a statute re-
quires the Secretary to do an affirmative act, such as determin-
ing which lands were to pass under the grant, does he possess
the power to make the determinations of law as well as fact
essential to the performance of that duty.68
While the distinction between law and fact may be difficult
if not impossible to make, its application in Tosco is clear. The
Mineral Leasing Act imposed no duty of affirmative action on
the Secretary regarding the disposition of withdrawn lands sub-
ject to mining claims. His only duty was to protect the interests
of the United States by granting patents only to qualified ap-
plicants. Therefore, the Secretary's determinations of law would
not bind either the Government or the claimants until the ques-
tions were settled by the courts.6 9
65. 290 U.S. at 142-43.
66. 278 U.S. 200 (1929).
67. Id. at 217-18.
68. Id. at 218-19.
69. Schopflocher, supra note 62, at 36, focuses on a situation where
a prior administrative decision is held null and void for lack of juris-
diction over the parties and concludes that there should be no question
that res judicata does not attach to the administrative determination;
rather, res judicata would attach only to a judicial affirmance of that
action. A footnote in the West decision indicates that the policy of the
Interior is not to treat its decisions as res judicata. 278 U.S. at 214 n.4.
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It may be argued that the court in Tosco overstated the law
when it said that a determination by a tribunal without subject
matter jurisdiction was wholly nugatory and not res judicata.70
The better approach is that taken by the Restatement of Judg-
ments. It states that a judgment by a court with personal juris-
diction over the parties cannot be collaterally attacked for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction unless public policy permits such
action.71 Factors indicating appropriate public policy grounds
for attacking a judgment are: (1) the clear lack of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter; (2) dependence of the deter-
mination as to jurisdiction upon a question of law rather than
of fact; (3) the limited jurisdiction of the court; (4) the fail-
ure to litigate the question of jurisdiction.72
The district court's broad formulation of the rule was not
necessary since all but one of the listed public policy factors
creating an exception to the general rule of no collateral attack
are applicable to Tosco.7 3 The question of whether the require-
ment of maintenance in section 37 included the performance of
annual assessment work was one of law, not fact. The juris-
diction of the Interior is statutorily limited to matters affecting
public lands. Since all administrative agencies are, in a sense, of
limited jurisdiction, the proper focus should be upon the extent
of the agency's jurisdiction within its particular field. The In-
terior's jurisdiction over public lands is broad,74 but the statute,
when properly interpreted, significantly limits the agency's juris-
70. However, this principle is also found in 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS§ 337 (5th ed. 1925).
71. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 207 (Proposed Final Draft 1942)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
72. Ibid. The formulation by the Restatement takes into account
the "boot-strap" doctrine of jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT § 206, comment
a. Under this doctrine, a tribunal is deemed to have jurisdiction to
determine its own subject-matter jurisdiction, and this determination is
binding at least where the parties were subject to personal jurisdiction
and argued the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction before the court.
This principle was applied to an administrative proceeding in Stoll v.
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938); see also Jackson v. Irving Trust
Co., 311 U.S. 494, 503 (1941), where the question whether the issue of
jurisdiction was actually litigated was held to be immaterial.
73. The question of whether "maintenance" included the perform-
ance of annual assessment work was not clear; therefore the first public
policy factor is inapplicable.
74. The defendant in Tosco relied upon this factor as evidence that
the Supreme Court had not meant that the Interior acted outside of its
subject-matter jurisdiction in the early contest proceedings. Brief for
Defendant, p. 17, Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall, 261 F. Supp. 954 (D. Colo.
1966); see Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963);
Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459-60, 464 (1910).
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diction. As for the fourth factor, none of the mining claimants
in Tosco appeared to answer the contest proceedings against their
claims.7 5 In effect, there was a default judgment and the issue of
jurisdiction was never actually litigated by these claimants. The
Restatement declares that the general rule of no collateral at-
tack is inapplicable where there is no litigation of any issue,
even though the party affected was before the court or other-
wise subject to its jurisdiction.7 6 Hence, although the Restate-
ment rule contradicts the broad principle relied upon by the
district court, both rules as applied to Tosco would appear to
reach the same result.
The other issues raised by the parties in Tosco were not
decided by the district court. However, some comment about
them is appropriate since they may be raised on appeal. The
Interior's arguments embraced concepts of acquiescence and
laches. Both of these concepts imply that the original claimants
should have taken some affirmative action after their mining
claims were declared invalid during the 1930's. 77
As to acquiescence, the claimants' conduct must be consid-
ered against the background of a mining law under which the
miner had contact with the Government only when he sought
to patent his claim.78 Further, a mining claim is intangible and
invisible, a mere right of which there is no evidence except a
possible record in some remote county court house.70 Conse-
quently, when the Interior declared the mining claims invalid,
no object changed hands. A miner could have sought rehearing,
appeal, or judicial review, but there was no statutory nor regu-
latory time limit on these remedies.80 Also, the intervention of
the Krushnic and Virginia-Colorado decisions must be considered.
These decisions, if read at all, must have assured a miner that
his claim was valid. This impression would have been buttressed
by the Interior's subsequent opinion in Shale Oil.s ' The claim-
ant could have tested this impression by asking for a rehearing
or by applying for a patent, but there was no duty to apply for
75. See the findings of fact by the district court, Oil Shale Corp.
v. Udall, 261 F. Supp. 954, 955-57 (D. Colo. 1966).
76. RESTATEMENT § 207, comment c.
77. 261 F. Supp. at 965.
78. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
79. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
80. See Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190, 196 n.5 (9th Cir.
1966).
81. See note 46 supra.
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a patent;8 2 and documents introduced in Toscos3 showed that
the Interior, after the Virginia-Colorado decision, answered in-
quiries of mining claimants to the effect that rehearings were
unnecessary. Consequently, the type of affirmative action that
should have been taken to avoid the implication of acquiescence
is unclear.
The doctrine of laches will probably not be extended to the
Tosco situation. As a general rule, laches, to be a valid de-
fense, requires a showing of lack of diligence by the party
against whom the defense is asserted and prejudice to the party
asserting the defense.8 4 The record in Tosco establishes no reli-
ance by the Interior on the effectiveness of the early contest
proceedings, nor acquiescence by the plaintiffs in those deci-
sions.85
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tosco decision has not ended the legal battles over the
disputed mining claims. Undoubtedly, the Interior will appeal
the decision of the district court. The mandatory injunctions to
issue patents sought by several of the plaintiffs in Tosco will
probably not be granted, since the Interior can still refuse on
the ground that the claims were abandoned. That issue is clearly
within its jurisdiction."
Proceedings within the Interior will therefore be necessary
to decide the issue of abandonment. The inactivity with regard
to the mining claims for a period of almost thirty years, coupled
with the failure of the original claimants to appear and challenge
the contest proceedings may sufficiently establish an intent to
abandon. 7 Thus, the district court decision represents only the
first major hurdle for the claimants.
82. See notes 12-20 supra.
83. 261 F. Supp. at 964 n.3; see Plaintiff's Trial Brief, App., Doe.
Nos. 136A, 175, 180-83, at pp. 111-17; Statement of Under Secretary of
the Interior John A. Carver, Jr., 1965 Hearings at 42.
84. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206,
215 (1963); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961); Socony
Mobil Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 335 F.2d 438, 441-42 (10th Cir.
1964).
85. 261 F. Supp. at 966.
86. Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639, 645 (1935).
87. The district court in Tosco disagrees with the idea that there
may have been abandonment of the mining claims. 261 F. Supp. at 966.
But see, Jackson, Legal, Political, and Administrative Problems in Oil
Shale, WEsTERN REsouRcEs CONFERENCE 287, 296-98 (1964). The Interior
Department is also threatening to review the issue of discovery with
regard to otherwise valid mining claims. Statement by Under Secretary
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of the Interior John A. Carver, Jr., 1935 Hearings at 40-41. There is
also a possibility that already patented oil shale claims may be subject
to challenge. Lohr, Conclusiveness of United States Oil Shale Placer
Mining Claim Patents, 43 DENVER L.J. 24 (1966). At the time of the
Union Oil decision, the Secretary directed commencement of proceedings
against all oil shale claims that may be invalid for any reason. Memor-
andum, Secretary of the Interior to Director, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, April 17, 1964.
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